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Abstract 
This paper explores whether health insurance coverage or improved quality at the 
hospital level protect better against out-of-pocket payments. Using data from a randomized 
policy experiment in the Philippines, we found that interventions to expand insurance coverage 
and improve provider quality both had an impact on out-of-pocket payments. The sample 
consists of 3,121 child-patient patient observations across 30 hospitals either at baseline in 
2003/04 or at the follow-up in 2007/08.  Compared to controls, interventions that expanded 
insurance and provided performance-based provider payments to improve quality both resulted 
in a decline in out-of-pocket spending (21% decline, p-value=0.061; and 24% decline, p-
value=0.017, respectively). With lower out-of-pocket payments for hospital care, monthly 
household spending on personal hygiene rose by 0.9 (p-value=0.026) and 0.6 US$ (p-
value=0.098) under the expanded insurance and provider payment interventions, respectively, 
amounting to roughly a 40 to 60% increase relative to the controls. With the current surge for 
health insurance expansion in developing countries, our study suggests paying increased and 
possibly, equal attention to supply-side interventions will have similar impacts with operational 
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1.  Introduction 
Out-of-pocket payments for health care are still the major source of health care financing in 
most developing countries. Such medical expenses have the potential to further increase the 
burden of poverty with an estimated 150 million people who fall into poverty due to 
catastrophic health care expenditures every year (McIntyre et al. 2006; van Doorslaer et al. 
2006; Xu et al. 2007). To better protect against unexpected illness and unplanned health care 
expenditures, a range of health sector financing reforms are implemented throughout 
developing countries. These public policy interventions range from the introduction of 
community-based health insurance (Jakab and Krishnan 2001; Smith and Sulzbach 2008; 
Mebratie et al. 2015), to health equity funds for the poor (Flores et al. 2013), improved access 
to quality health care through set user fees (Litvack and Bodart 1993), or the introduction of 
social health insurance programs for a large portion of the (so far uninsured) population 
(Limwattananon et al. 2015; Sparrow et al. 2013b; King et al. 2009; Thornton et al. 2010).  A 
detailed literature review about health care financing reforms and their impact on access, 
utilization of care and financial protection can be found in the online appendix A1 [INSERT 
LINK TO ONLINE APPENDIX A1]. 
Yet, there is an important dearth in understanding and a lack of studies that contrast the 
impact of demand-side, insurance-based reforms versus supply-side, provider payment reforms. 
This adds to policy uncertainty over how best to provide financial protection to the poor. In this 
study, we contrast a demand- and a supply-side intervention implemented in 30 public hospitals 
in the central regions of the Philippines to assess which one achieves a greater reduction in out-
of-pocket expenditures for incidences of child hospitalization. The randomized health policy 
experiment, known as the Quality Improvement Demonstration Study (QIDS), was conducted 
between 2003 and 2008. QIDS was a large-scale community level intervention with a combined 
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catchment area of an estimated one million households. The 30 hospitals participating in the 
study were randomly assigned into a control site and two different policy intervention sites, one 
expanding access to health insurance and the other intervention incentivizing hospital staff 
through bonus payments. The overarching objective of QIDS was to evaluate the effects of 
these policies on the health status of children, through utilization and quality channels. The 
focus was on children who were hospitalized due to pneumonia and diarrhea as these diseases 
are among the leading causes of morbidity and mortality among Filipino children (Department 
of Health 2011). Large returns to these conditions were expected since they do not reflect 
routine hospitalizations but urgent cases.  
We estimate the impact of the QIDS demand-side insurance intervention compared to 
the supply-side incentive intervention along five dimensions: (i) out-of-pocket payments for 
hospital services, (ii) the costs of medical treatment inside and outside the hospital, and (iii) 
household spending on disease prevention. To analyze overall expenditure patterns we further 
look at (iv) total household health expenditures independent of the incidence of hospitalization 
under study and whether (v) there is reallocation of household spending. We show that both 
interventions reduced out-of-pocket payments for child hospitalizations by at least 20% without 
any discernable statistical differences (p-value=0.825). Moreover, we found that monthly 
household spending on personal hygiene rose by 0.9 (p-value=0.026) and 0.6 (p-value=0.098) 
US$ under the expanded insurance and provider payment intervention, respectively.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The contextual background and 
design of the project are presented in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the data. Section 4 
introduces the two empirical specifications, the linear fixed effects and Poisson fixed effects 
model. Results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Setting 
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2.1 Contextual background 
In the Philippines, improving access to care has been a priority policy concern since the Health 
Sector Reform Agenda was launched in 1999 through the National Health Insurance Program, 
more commonly known as PhilHealth. PhilHealth's mandate is to provide universal health 
insurance coverage. According to their own reports PhilHealth covers 88% of the population 
(PhilHealth 2015).  Yet, based on national surveys the actual coverage rate seems smaller: The 
2008 National Demographic and Health Survey indicates that 47.8% of surveyed households 
had at least one household member covered by PhilHealth further revealing that about 58% of 
the poorest children with acute respiratory illness receive medical treatment and only about 
37% of the poorest children with symptoms of diarrhea get oral rehydration therapy (NDHS 
2008). 
In PhilHealth’s aim to provide financial protection to the poor, the insurer targets 
selected population groups, i.e. government-employees, indigent individuals, retirees, and 
overseas workers. To afford more financial protection, among these groups, the insurance 
premiums vary, for example, an average formally employed individual pays a premium of 3,370 
pesos per person and year. This corresponds to roughly 76.5 US$ applying the peso-US$ 
exchange rate of 0.0227, which was observed in January 2015. The insurance covers the 
individual, spouse, and dependent children under 21 years. Indigent individuals are sponsored 
by the national and local governments, which pay PhilHealth premiums amounting to 2,400 
pesos (≈54.4 US$) per household and year. The basic benefit package covers inpatient care but 
not outpatient care or medications purchased outside of the hospital.  
PhilHealth finances only about 10% of the overall personal health care spending in the 
Philippines (NSCB 2013). Despite expanding coverage and subsidized premiums aimed 
towards the poor, the Philippine National Health Accounts (2011) indicate that out-of-pocket 
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expenditures remain the most dominant form of health-care financing, accounting for 52.7% of 
total health-care expenditures in 2011 (NSCB 2013).  
 
2.2 QIDS project 
The Quality Improvement Demonstration Study (QIDS), a 5-year project, was undertaken to 
potentially benefit an estimated one million households. Launched in 2001, community level 
randomization was applied to 30 public hospitals that were organized into matched blocks of 
three and randomly assigned to either one of two interventions and a control group. The 
matching was done based on demand and supply characteristics of the hospitals such as 
population, average household income, number of beds, average case load, PhilHealth 
accreditation and insurance coverage of the households. The hospitals are geographically 
dispersed, with some completely isolated because they are located on different islands. Thus, 
spill-overs between the experimental groups and the control groups were minimized. It is also 
unlikely that households go to different hospitals for health care services since this would entail 
even longer commuting time and higher transportation costs.  
Two interventions were implemented and financed by PhilHealth involving alternative 
methods of making payments in public hospitals. In general, hospitals that are PhilHealth 
accredited provide insurance coverage to their members either on a reimbursement basis or 
through a direct deduction on the patient’s hospital bill. The amount of insurance coverage is 
pre-determined and based on the severity of the case, i.e., whether ordinary, intensive, or 
catastrophic. In addition, PhilHealth compensates the attending physicians of accredited 
hospital. The compensation is a daily rate accounting for the level of training of the physician, 
i.e. 105 pesos (2.38 US$) for general practitioners and 150 pesos (3.41 US$) for specialists. 
Further details can be found in the PhilHealth Board Resolution No. 324-00.  
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Building on PhilHealth’s insurance coverage, the first intervention targets the demand-
side. It is known as “Access”. It sought to reduce out-of-pocket payments by (i) ensuring that 
households in Access sites are PhilHealth covered by increasing enrollment efforts, and (ii) 
automatically classifying pediatric patients in Access hospitals as “intensive” cases.  To achieve 
increased enrollment, QIDS staff was deployed as “policy navigators” to local governments 
since the latter could subsidize PhilHealth premiums of their indigent constituents. The QIDS 
study sites were relatively poor, with average household income estimated at 60% below the 
national levels (Quimbo et al. 2011). Hence, the most effective way of increasing PhilHealth 
enrollment in Access sites was through premium subsidies by local governments. This was 
known as the PhilHealth “Sponsored Program”. Effectively indigenous households were 
eligible for fully subsidized premiums and zero co-payments since costs were covered by the 
insurance. Prior to the experiment, we verified that insurance amounts would on average cover 
hospital bills for “intensive” cases. The expected effect of the Access intervention was to 
increase PhilHealth insurance coverage such that out-of-pocket payments for children aged 5 
years and below are substantially reduced.  
The second intervention targeted the supply side and is known as the “Bonus” 
intervention. We introduced a system of monitoring quality of care and paid bonuses for quality 
improvements. Quality of physician services was measured through clinical vignettes, open-
ended paper cases of hypothetical patients that simulate and measure actual clinical practice. 
Selected physicians were required to complete vignettes for three target conditions: child 
pneumonia, diarrhea, and a common dermatological condition. To complete each vignette, 
physicians were asked questions intended to capture diagnostic skills. Note that vignettes are 
an accredited approach for assessing physician quality (Dresselhaus et al, 2000; Peabody et al. 
2000; Peabody et al. 2004). 
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The overall score for each Bonus hospital was an index that combined the hospital’s 
average of individual physician vignette scores, case load, and patient satisfaction scores. The 
weights attached to each of these three components were 70, 10, and 20%, respectively. Patient 
satisfaction was measured using the Patient Satisfaction Questionnaire 18 (PSQ-18), a short 
form of the Patient Satisfaction Questionnaire III (Marshall and Hays 1994). PSQ-18 covers 
seven domains of quality: general satisfaction, technical quality, interpersonal skills, 
communication, finances, amount of time spent with the provider, and access to care. Bonus 
hospitals that met predefined cut-off scores for a particular quarter were eligible for bonuses. 
This was implemented by automatically applying the specialist rate in computing PhilHealth 
payments for all physicians. While the experiment was conducted, a substantial majority of the 
physicians in Bonus hospitals were generalists (72%). On average, we estimate that bonus-
eligible physicians received a 5% increase in income during the experiment. Bonus payments 
were given quarterly from 2004 to 2007. The physicians received the bonuses with their 
salaries. No targeting or recruitment efforts were required to make the Bonus intervention 
operable. The existing system for administering payments could be used for the additional 
payments. 
Bonus payments are expected to affect out-of-pocket payments indirectly. While 
patients still have to pay for the treatment, bonus payments provide incentives to doctors to 
perform better by making more accurate diagnoses, prescribing the appropriate tests and 
treatments and not aiming at extra income by suggesting additional outside the hospital 
treatments (James et al. 2009). When physicians better manage patients, expenditures can fall 
(Peabody et al. 2010) and length of stay can be reduced (Carey, Sheth and Braithwaite 2005). 
In QIDS sites, we found that the relationship between costs and quality is U-shaped (Peabody 
et al. 2010). At sufficiently low initial quality levels, improvements in quality can reduce out-
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of-pocket payments: at below 60% vignette scores, every 10 percentage point increase in 
quality is associated with an average 20% decline in charges. 
Throughout this paper we refer to the “Access” intervention as “intervention A” and the 
“Bonus” intervention as “intervention B”. The hospitals in the control group, referred to as “C 
sites”, continued with the existing policies and practices. The three types of randomly selected 
hospitals in A, B, and C sites constitute the primary sampling unit for the evaluation of the 
QIDS interventions.  
For the evaluation of the interventions data were collected before and after the two 
health policy reforms were introduced. Data for this paper were obtained from two QIDS 
sources: (i) a patient exit survey and (ii) a follow-home survey 4-6 weeks after the child patient 
was discharged from the hospital. The patient exit and household surveys were conducted in 
2003/04 and 2007/08.  By the time the second follow-up survey commenced, interventions had 
been in place for close to 2 years. The patient exit surveys were administered among the parents 
of child patients up to the age of 5 years. A total of 6,042 children were surveyed. During the 
patient exit survey detailed information about the out-of-pocket expenditures, those incurred 
inside and outside the hospital, were collected. Among the surveyed children, pneumonia and 
diarrhea patients were eligible for the follow home survey. Altogether, 3,183 children were 
revisited at home of whom we have complete information for 3,121 children. Lost observations 
due to missing information amount to less than 2% of the overall sample. The follow home 
surveys in both rounds provide a detailed socioeconomic profile of the household including 
information on spending patterns independent of the child hospitalization. Ethical approval for 
the study was obtained from the Committee on Human Research of the University of the 
Philippines. 
 
3.   Data 
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The sample consists of 3,121 household observations, each of which had a child-patient 
in one of the 30 QIDS hospitals either at baseline in 2003/04 or at the follow-up in 2007/08. 
The observations are equally split across the three types of sites: In the A sites we have 
information on 1,036 patients; B sites comprise 1,055 observations; and the remaining 1,030 
patients frequented the C sites. In the first survey round, a total of 1,393 child patients 
participated; the follow-up survey covered 1,728 patients.  
Basic descriptive statistics illustrating the features of the sampled child patients and their 
households are presented in Table 1. Of the total number of children 43.5% are girls. The 
children are, on average, slightly older than one and a half years and stay 4 days in the hospital. 
By design, the sample is equally split among pneumonia and diarrhea patients. Households have 
about six members and at least one child below the age of 14 for every working adult. On 
average, the households have a monthly per capita income of 1,054 pesos (≈23.9 US$). As the 
primary sampling unit for the randomization is hospitals, we test for the balancing of the 
baseline child and household characteristics across the three hospital groups. Comparing child 
and household characteristics at baseline for each of the three cohorts, we find that the two 
intervention groups and the control site are comprised of children with statistically similar 
characteristics at the 5% significance level in all the 30 comparisons. However, maternal 
education and per capita family income are slightly higher at baseline in the insurance 
expansion group compared to the control group (p-value=0.064 and 0.058, respectively).  No 
significant differences are found for the pay-for-performance group (p-value>0.1). Moreover, 
child characteristics such as age, gender and severity of disease are similar across all three 
groups (p-value>0.1). Yet, to account for child and household heterogeneity in the analysis, we 
jointly include these variables as controls in our empirical model. 
 We assess five sets of outcomes: (i) out-of-pocket expenditures, (ii) expenditures 
incurred inside versus outside the hospital, (iii) total household expenditures on health care 
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(independent of the child hospitalization) (iv) household expenditures associated with disease 
prevention such as water and sanitation as well as (v) household expenditures on non-health 
items including food and other household consumption expenditures. The five sets of outcome 
variables are all measured in terms of pesos spent.  
We define out-of-pocket payments as all direct outlays of cash that are incurred because 
of the child hospitalization under study. They include the total medical spending associated 
with the hospitalization as well as transportation and food expenditures related to the 
hospitalization.   
Concerning the costs incurred inside and outside the hospital we observe the following: 
In the Philippines, like many developing countries, services and goods needed by a patient may 
not be completely available within a single facility. Referrals to other facilities, say, for 
diagnostic procedures or services of a specialist, are frequent. The same is true for purchases of 
drugs, which can be done outside the hospital if the prescribed drugs are not available in the 
hospital pharmacy. Poorly funded hospitals may not be equipped with basic diagnostic 
machines such as X-rays and tend to have pharmacies that are not well stocked. Arguably then, 
expanded insurance coverage, which means increased resources at the hospital, would imply 
increased availability of goods and services and the reduced need for patients to purchase goods 
and services outside the hospital. Of course, there could be other reasons for patients preferring 
to purchase goods and services outside the facility. Prices inside the facility could be higher 
even with insurance or doctors could prescribe drugs that are not available inside the hospital 
but rather in a pharmacy outside the hospital where they have a financial interest (James et al. 
2009).  Most insurance claims against PhilHealth are, however, for purchases inside the 
hospital, rather than outside the hospital. Therefore, we distinguish between two types of 
illness-related medical spending: those incurred inside and outside the hospital. 
The household-level consumption expenses that are not directly related to the child 
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hospitalization such as overall health expenditures, expenditures associated with disease 
prevention and consumption expenditures are denoted in per capita and month terms. The 
household health expenditures include drugs and medicines, hospital room charges, medical 
and dental charges, and other medical goods and supplies. There is the possibility of conflation 
between the costs associated with the child hospitalization under study and the per capita health 
expenditures that are (presumably) not linked to the hospitalization: The former information 
was collected at patient exit and is likely to be an accurate representation of the actual costs 
incurred. The latter was collected as part of the household survey that was administered 4-6 
weeks after patient discharge. Findings associated with per capita household health 
expenditures need to be assessed keeping this caveat in mind. 
Our measure of spending on disease prevention includes the following components: (i) 
toilet/bath soap, body deodorants, lotion, tissue paper, (ii) drinking water, water used for 
bathing and washing and (iii) laundry and laundry soap. We also study non-health related 
expenditures. Food consumption expenditures include the consumption of beverages and are 
likely to be a lower bound of food consumption as the majority of the households under study 
self-consume their own production and only buy foodstuff on the market and report 
expenditures for food, which they do not grow themselves. Education expenditures comprise 
matriculation fees, allowance for family members studying away from home, as well as books 
and school supplies. Finally, expenditures for durable goods comprise those for clothing, 
furnishing, dinnerware and house maintenance. 
The descriptive statistics for the outcome variables show that out-of-pocket payments 
for the hospitalization of the child patient amounted to 2,212 pesos (≈50.2 US$) on average 
(Table 2). Average out-of-pocket payments are slightly higher than total medical spending 
associated with the hospitalization because the former also cover transportation and food 
expenditures related to the hospitalization.  Total spending is mainly made up of costs incurred 
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inside the hospital, an average of 1,422 pesos (≈32.3 US$). Expenditures for health services 
used outside the hospital amount to an average of 677 pesos (≈15.4 US$).  Since we consider 
actual hospitalizations we are not concerned about zeros in out-of-pocket expenditures. 
Next, we turn to household level expenditures not including the costs of the 
hospitalization of the child patient under study. Per capita health expenditures are 88 pesos 
(≈2.0 US$), accounting for 8.6% of the total monthly expenditure per individual. Keep in mind 
that there might be some conflation between the hospitalization under study and per capita 
household health expenditures. On average, per capita health expenditures are of similar range 
as the per capita costs for toiletries, water and sanitation that amount to 82 pesos (≈1.9 US$). 
Taken together, monthly health expenditures and those for personal hygiene make up for 16% 
of the total monthly per capita expenditures. Relative to these 170 pesos constituted by the 
regular health care and preventive care spending, the out-of-pocket payments for the child 
hospitalization amount to roughly 13 times the monthly expenditures per household member.  
We also looked at other expenditure groups in the household. Monthly per capita 
expenditures for food consumption including beverages amount to 552 pesos (≈12.5 US$). This 
rather moderate amount relative to overall costs is consistent with spending by the poor who 
rely on home production (rather than market goods) to cover their basic nutritional needs 
(Folbre, 1984; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2002).  The poverty level of 
these households is further demonstrated by the low per capita spending for education and 
durable goods such as clothing, furnishing, dinnerware and house maintenance, amounting to 
28 and 59 pesos (≈0.6 and 1.3 US$) on a per capita and month basis, respectively. For 
comparison, per capita monthly costs for transport and communication average about 56 pesos, 
which is similar to the amount for durable goods. 
 To assess the impact of the A and B interventions on outcome variables, we compared 
the two treatment and the control groups after the implementation of the intervention testing for 
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differences in means (Table 2). Three patterns stood out. First, the direct comparison of means 
reveals that out-of-pocket payments are roughly 450 pesos (≈10.2 US$) lower in both the A 
and B intervention sites compared to the controls (p-value=0.000). Second, the out-of-pocket 
spending levels inside and outside of the hospital differ systematically across the three types of 
sites. In the control sites, expenditures outside the hospital are between 436 and 565 larger 
(≈10.2 US$, p-value=0.000) whereas patients in either intervention sites spend more on services 
inside the hospital. The latter result is mainly driven by the B intervention. Third, overall health 
expenditures at the household level are lower for families residing in the intervention sites (p-
value<0.010).  However, these lower health expenditures do not seem to be linked to changes 
in the expenditures for per capita monthly food consumption. Food consumption is on average, 
at the same level for households residing in all three sites given a significance level of 1%. At 
the 5% significance level we fail to reject the equality of means in food consumption for B and 
C sites. Per capita monthly education expenditures and those for transport and communication 
are identical when comparing average levels in the two intervention areas with those in the 
control group (p-value>0.1).  
 
 
4.  Empirical Specification 
A multivariate analysis is performed to identify the impact of the two QIDS 
interventions on the identified expenditure categories. The effects of the two interventions are 
estimated in a difference-in-difference specification that compares the changes in the costs of 
care in intervention sites with the corresponding changes in control sites over the two rounds 
of data collection. We employ a fixed effects model that allows us to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity at the hospital level such as location and stable regional conditions. Inflation 
dynamics are taken care of by the year (national trend) and the hospital fixed effects (regional 
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disparities). We allow the error term to be clustered across individuals that are treated at the 
same hospital.  
While the linear fixed effects model is our benchmark model, we also employ a fixed 
effects Poisson model with cluster-bootstrapped standard errors as robustness test. The Poisson 
model better encompasses our expenditure variables, which do not follow a normal distribution 
but are censored at zero and skewed to the right due to some severe cases where large health 
spending occurred (Sparrow et al. 2013a). Although our dependent variables are not count data 
in the strict sense, the Poisson model has shown to be well suited for consistent estimation in 
the context of health costs (Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004). A detailed description of the empirical 
models and methodological decisions can be found in the online appendices A2 and A3 
[INSERT LINK TO ONLINE APPENDICES A2 AND A3]. 
 
5.  Results    
The findings from the linear fixed effects model show that intervention A reduces out-
of-pocket payments by 558 pesos (≈12.7 US$, p-value=0.072)(Table 3). Intervention B, which 
appears to be more effective, reduces out-of-pocket payments on average by 638 pesos (≈14.5 
US$, p-value=0.028). Comparing the coefficient estimates associated with Intervention A and 
B we find that both interventions are similarly effective in reducing out-of-pocket payments (p-
value=0.797). 
These fixed-effects estimates are consistent with the Poisson regression results (Table 
3, Column 2). While the magnitude of the coefficient estimates from the Poisson model is not 
directly comparable with that of the linear model, we observe a similar statistically significant 
and negative relationship between the two interventions and out-of-pocket payments. 
Calculating the incidence rate ratio, which is obtained by applying the exponential function to 
the Poisson coefficient, we see that the out-of-pocket payments are lower  (<1) for patients 
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residing in the intervention areas.  For intervention A, the incidence rate ratio is 0.79 (=exp(–
0.241)) indicating that expanded health insurance reduces out-of-pocket payments by 21% ((1–
0.79)*100; p-value=0.061). Intervention B reduces out-of-pocket payments by about 24% 
(=(1–exp(–0.274))*100; p-value=0.017). The magnitudes of the Poisson incidence rate ratios 
are in line with the coefficient estimates from the linear model and the average out-of-pocket 
spending across the three sites (Table 2). Comparing the average out-of-pocket payments of 
2,212 pesos (≈50.2 US$) to the reduction in out-of-pocket payments of 558 pesos (638 pesos) 
induced by intervention A (B), this corresponds to a 30% (29%) decline in out-of-pocket 
spending. Thus, we present consistent evidence that in the Philippines out-of-pocket spending 
declined due to increased insurance coverage. Second, we show that provider-based incentives 
can similarly reduce the economic burden of out-of-pocket spending.   
The total medical spending resulting from the child hospitalization is also lower in 
intervention areas with the point estimates significant at 9.9 and 11.7% for interventions A and 
B, respectively. From the Poisson regressions, we obtain more precise estimates confirming 
that patients who utilized intervention A and B hospitals face lower overall expenditures (p-
value=0.040 and 0.027, respectively). Although we cannot determine which intervention is 
overall less costly because the coefficient estimates are statistically identical (p-value=0.607). 
But we can say that the QIDS supply side intervention, which improves the quality of care 
through a pay-for-performance scheme, reduces out-of-pocket and total medical spending as 
much as the expanded health insurance policy. 
To further disentangle the effects on out-of-pocket payments, we separately looked at 
expenditures incurred inside and outside the hospital. Results show that the reductions in 
expenditures are driven by lower expenditures outside the hospital (Table 3, Columns 5 to 8). 
Spending inside the hospital is not significantly affected by the interventions.  
However, expenditures incurred outside the hospital decrease by 436 pesos (≈9.9 US$) 
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for intervention A and 565 pesos (≈12.8 US$) for intervention B. Consistent with the findings 
for out-of-pocket payments, outside hospital expenditures are similarly affected by the two 
interventions; the coefficient estimates associated with interventions A and B are similar (p-
value=0.431). Further support for this finding comes again from the Poisson model. For 
intervention A, we observe that outside hospital expenditures decrease by 44% (=(1–exp(–
0.578))*100). Similarly, for intervention B outside hospital expenditures decrease by 55% 
(=(1–exp(–0.799))*100).  Again, the coefficient estimates are not significantly different from 
each other (p-value=0.449).  This reduction in outside hospital spending could suggest a 
reduction in demand as more services are now directly utilized within the hospital. The 
combined findings about inside and outside hospital expenditures clarify that the two 
interventions did not increase inside hospital spending but concomitantly reduced expenditures 
outside the hospital.  
Finally, we examined to what extent the reduced out-of-pocket payments resulting from 
interventions A and B induced changes in other household expenditures. We find that per capita 
health expenditures that are not linked to the hospitalization under study are lower in 
intervention sites (Table 4, Columns 1 and 2). Expanded insurance reduces per capita monthly 
health expenditures by 75 pesos (≈1.7 US$); the bonus intervention reduces per capita health 
expenditures by 47 pesos per month (≈1.1 US$). Again, the Poisson model supports these 
results and indicates a reduction in overall health expenditures by almost 60% ((1–exp(–
0.885))*100) as a consequence of Intervention A.  Intervention B similarly reduces health 
expenditures, namely by 42% ((1–exp(–0.546))*100). As indicated in section 3 there is the 
possibility that the reported per capita health expenditures are conflated with the costs of the 
hospitalization under study. Despite the fact that we collected information on per capita health 
expenditures in an independent household survey, we acknowledge that households might add 
up the costs. 
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We also looked at the impacts of the two interventions on expenditures that are 
associated with disease prevention, i.e. the combined costs for toiletries, water and sanitation 
(Table 4, Columns 3 and 4). Households benefitting from interventions A and B spend more on 
personal hygiene with per capita monthly spending on these products rising by 41 (≈0.9 US$, 
p-value=0.026) and 27 pesos (≈0.6 US$, p-value=0.098), respectively. While these increases in 
spending on hygiene appear small, in our study sites they are sufficient to purchase additional 
clean water. With an incidence rate ratio between 1.40 and 1.61, the Poisson model confirms 
these findings revealing that the interventions A and B increase spending on water and hygiene 
by roughly 40 to 60% relative to the control group (p-value=0.025 and 0.094, respectively). 
Equality of the coefficient estimates cannot be rejected (p-value=0.341) indicating that 
interventions A and B similarly trigger a resource reallocation towards preventive care. In light 
of the analyzed diseases, namely diarrhea and pneumonia the results on personal hygiene 
spending are of particular interest. Diarrhea is a water-related disease that is most common for 
individuals who do not have access to clean water for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene. 
Similarly, the immune system of children drinking low quality water is impaired making severe 
conditions such as pneumonia more likely to develop. At the time of the experiment, the average 
price of a one-liter bottle of water was about 12 to 25 pesos in the capital region, Metro Manila 
(Magtibay 2004). Thus, a 27 to 41 peso increase per capita in spending on clean water could 
have been used by households to purchase an additional 1 to 3 liters of bottled water per month.  
The additional 3 liters are equivalent to 8% of the monthly requirement of clean water for 
children aged 1 to 3 years (Food and Nutrition Board 2004). 
We further considered the impact of the interventions on household expenditures for 
items such as food consumption, education, and durable goods (Appendix, Table A.1). Across 
specifications and expenditure categories we do not find significant intervention effects. The 
freed up resources from reduced out-of-pocket payments do not appear to be re-allocated to 
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these other expenditure groups.  
 We note two potential limitations of our study. First, we only establish policy impacts 
for those children who are sick and admitted to a hospital. We argue, however, that our 
interventions potentially benefited the population at large. Intervention A aimed at increasing 
enrollment in health insurance, in particular enrollment of vulnerable populations. The quality 
improvement aimed at with intervention B is for the benefit of all patient types.  
Second, we focus our analysis exclusively on children with diarrhea and pneumonia. 
These are severe conditions among children and the leading causes of morbidity and mortality 
(see Section 2). UNICEF and the World Health Organization (2013) acknowledge that diarrhea 
and pneumonia are the two leading causes of preventable child death and have put in place an 
integrated global action plan and a working group to end child death from these conditions by 
2025. Our research contributes to these efforts. We abstain from drawing conclusions for adults 
but observe that out-of-pocket expenditures related to severe conditions in children are a burden 
that affects the entire household. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The QIDS experiment provided a unique opportunity to contrast the effectiveness of a 
demand- and supply-side intervention in providing financial risk protection to poor households 
for instances of child hospitalization. Both the expanded insurance and quality incentive 
intervention had lower out-of-pocket payments compared to the controls. There was a 21% 
(24%) decline in out-of-pocket spending due to intervention A (B) with no statistical difference 
between the two interventions. Similarly, total medical expenditures were lower in intervention 
areas compared to controls. The reductions in medical expenditures were driven by lower 
expenditures outside the hospital (no differences seen in inside hospital expenditures comparing 
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interventions to control).  This suggests that all services can be obtained inside the hospitals 
without incurring additional out-of-pocket payments outside the hospital.  
Moreover, intervention households reported lower overall curative health expenditures 
over the preceding six months indicating that the households may be more aware of preventive 
measures and more inclined to employ preventive care when they are financially protected 
against adverse health events.  This was further supported by increased spending on preventive 
health care as captured by purchase of clean water and hygiene-related expenditures. This 
suggests that freed-up household resources due to reduced out-of-pocket payments may have 
long-term implications on household health as households seem to spend these resources on 
health goods that prevent infectious diseases.  
While we acknowledge that our results are context and design specific, we consider it 
as one of the biggest advantages of the study at hand to experimentally compare two different 
social policy interventions to protect the poor from high health care expenditures.  Interestingly, 
we found similar impacts from both the demand- and the supply-side health care intervention 
with no significant differences between the two policies. As hypothesized, the insurance 
scheme reduced out-of-pocket payments. The finding highlights that it is possible to implement 
health insurance reforms in developing countries that lead to increased financial protection of 
the insured. This is a particularly important finding as existing research about out-of-pocket 
payments shows that health insurance does not necessarily lead to lower health spending at the 
household level due to moral hazard by the doctors and hospitals (Dutta and Husain, 2012; Yip 
and Hsiao, 2009; Hsiao, 2008). In addition, we find evidence indicating that improved quality 
due to provider-based incentives also protects households from the financial risk of illness. It 
appears that the QIDS pay-for-performance scheme improved the clinical skills of doctors 
thereby reducing unnecessary prescriptions of drugs and medical tests and thus reducing out-
of-pocket payments.  The quality intervention, by reducing spending outside the hospital, 
 21 
arguably, also increases hospital accountability for service and health outcomes. The pathway 
for the provider-based intervention is improved quality for in and outpatient care.  
The study at hand challenges the current surge for health insurance expansion in 
developing countries and suggests paying increased and possibly, equal attention to supply-side 
interventions. As demonstrated, supply-side interventions can have similar financial protection 
impacts but combined with operational simplicity and greater provider accountability. Since, 
health care providers can be expected to have structures in place for advancing salaries and 
bonus payments, they are an efficient conduit for administering the financial side of health 
reforms. Targeting hospitals and their physicians implies that only a circumscribed number of 
individuals and institutions need to be collaborated with. In turn, for the insurance intervention 
to be effective, it was necessary to enroll households into PhilHealth. The potential set of 
insurees was considerably larger compared to the straightforward group of doctors working in 
PhilHealth accredited hospitals. Enrollment needed to be organized for the households outside 
a pre-defined institutional context. Moreover, given the relatively low income levels of most of 
the households in the target areas, they were eligible for premium subsidies, which involved 
local governments. The local governments needed to be reached out to with policy navigators 
and social marketing efforts implying additional costs of targeting. 
Therefore, we argue for further advancing research on the impacts of both demand-side, 
insurance-based reforms and supply-side, provider payment reforms to quell the uncertainty 
over how best to provide financial protection to the poor.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of control variables, the total number of observations is 3,121. Balancing of baseline characteristics across the two 15 
interventions and the control group are presented in Columns 3 to 8. The last three columns present the p-values of the associated difference in 16 
means tests. The number of baseline observations in Access/Bonus/Control are 447/479/467 child patients, respectively.  17 
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 22 
   Baseline characteristics Difference 
in means 
(A-C)     
p-value 
Difference 
in means 
(B-C)     
p-value 
Difference 
in means 
(A-B)     
p-value 
 Overall Sample Access Bonus Control 
 Mean  Std.Dev. Mean  Std.Dev. Mean  Std.Dev. Mean  Std.Dev. 
Dependents 0-14 years (ratio) 1.178 0.636 1.175 0.605 1.149 0.579 1.173 0.657 0.952 0.550 0.494 
Dependents 65+ (ratio) 0.046 0.141 0.048 0.130 0.036 0.103 0.048 0.157 0.980 0.149 0.111 
Duration of stay 4.306 3.640 4.251 1.803 4.200 2.054 4.094 1.969 0.211 0.417 0.694 
Child had pneumonia 0.494 0.500 0.472 0.500 0.501 0.501 0.497 0.501 0.455 0.896 0.378 
Child had diarrhea 0.506 0. 500 0.528 0.500 0.499 0.501 0.503 0.501 0.455 0.896 0.378 
Child is female 0.435 0.496 0.412 0.493 0.445 0.497 0.430 0.496 0.566 0.659 0.311 
Age of the child (in months) 19.930 12.282 19.978 12.810 19.367 12.079 19.916 12.586 0.942 0.494 0.456 
Maternal education 8.841 3.219 8.975 3.167 8.846 3.324 8.576 3.340 0.064 0.214 0.544 
Per capita monthly income 1,054.819 1,360.710 1,048.707 1,023.989 999.141 1,065.924 890.948 1,444.100 0.058 0.189 0.471 
Household size 5.790 2.197 5.727 2.308 5.816 2.301 5.668 2.098 0.686 0.301 0.556 
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  Comparison of means after the intervention Difference in 
means (A-C) 
p-value 
Difference in 
means (B-C) 
p-value 
Difference in 
means (A-B) 
p-value 
 Overall Sample Access Bonus Control 
 Mean  Std.Dev. Mean  Std.Dev. Mean  Std.Dev. Mean  Std.Dev. 
Expenditures associated with the child hospitalization          
   Out-of-pocket expenditures 2,212.428 1,654.859 2,249.550 1,679.152 2,188.876 1,599.459 2,667.899 1,774.829 0.000 0.000 0.528 
   Total medical expenditure 2,099.620 1,596.704 2,250.008 1,542.618 2,384.375 1,778.317 2,455.374 1,630.074 0.028 0.483 0.168 
   Expenditures inside the hospital 1,422.550 1,271.020 1,562.851 1,279.145 1,873.651 1,662.934 1,459.436 1,221.331 0.161 0.000 0.000 
   Expenditures outside the hospital 677.070 833.604 687.157 652.763 510.725 517.493 995.938 1,090.877 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Per capita household expenditures unrelated to the child hospitalization          
   Health expenditures pc/m 88.242 113.547 79.977 92.674 104.572 117.190 128.111 172.952 0.000 0.008 0.000 
   Hygiene, water and sanitation expenditures pc/m 81.959 118.649 98.124 228.364 75.758 71.792 74.205 69.836 0.018 0.712 0.026 
   Food consumption pc/m 551.733 351.359 563.035 402.413 545.669 302.817 590.765 384.375 0.234 0.032 0.419 
   Expenditures for durable goods pc/m 58.823 296.892 69.430 494.010 32.148 114.892 65.414 185.153 0.856 0.000 0.078 
   Education expenditures pc/m 28.392 87.095 31.905 96.334 27.817 123.094 36.563 87.394 0.392 0.169 0.528 
   Transport and communication expenditures pc/m 56.467 91.977 66.449 101.776 55.033 83.873 64.801 116.679 0.799 0.106 0.038 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables, the total number of observations is 3,121. “pc/m” refers to per capita and month at the 25 
household level. For the variables “Health expenditures pc/m” and “Hygiene, water and sanitation expenditures pc/m” only 3,073 and 3,064 26 
observations are available, respectively. Similarly, for the variables “Food consumption pc/m”, “Education expenditures pc/m” and “Expenditures 27 
for transport and communication pc/m” only 3,044, 3,073 and 3,082 observations are available, respectively. Comparison of means across the three 28 
groups, after the interventions are put in place, are presented in Columns 3 to 8. The last three columns present the p-values of the associated 29 
difference in means tests. 30 
 31 
 32 
 29 
 33 
 
Out-of-pocket 
expenditures 
Total medical 
expenditures associated 
with the hospitalization 
Expenditures inside the 
hospital 
Expenditures outside the 
hospital 
         
 OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
Access intervention -558.043+ -0.241+ -559.629+ -0.289* -123.365 -0.131   -436.264+ -0.578* 
 (298.547) (0.128) (328.237) (0.141) (335.488) (0.241)   (221.636) (0.282) 
Bonus intervention -638.483* -0.274* -413.067 -0.223* 151.866 0.026   -564.932* -0.799** 
 (276.763) (0.115) (255.464) (0.101) (240.078) (0.165)   (211.426) (0.277) 
Observations 3,121 3,121 3,121 3,121 3,121 3,121 3,121 3,121 
Hospitals 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Table 3: Results for expenditures associated with the child hospitalization, namely (i) out-of-34 
pocket expenditures, (ii) the total medical expenditures associated with the hospitalization, (iii) 35 
expenditures inside and (iv) outside the hospital. The following control variables are included: 36 
Gender and age of the child, duration of stay, whether the child had pneumonia, maternal 37 
education, per capita monthly income, household size, dependency ratio for 0-14 year olds and 38 
65+ year olds, round dummy. The standard errors of the linear model are clustered at the 39 
hospital level, the standard errors of the Poisson model are cluster-bootstrapped at the hospital 40 
level with 500 replications. +/*/** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level, 41 
respectively. 42 
 43 
 44 
 
Health expenditures per 
capita/month 
Hygiene, water and 
sanitation expenditures 
per capita/month 
 OLS Poisson OLS Poisson 
Access intervention -75.377** -0.885** 41.472* 0.474*  
 (25.697) (0.235) (17.674) (0.211)   
Bonus intervention -46.810+ -0.546* 27.413+ 0.333+  
 (26.400) (0.238) (16.018) (0.199)   
Observations 3,073 3,073 3,064 3,064 
Hospitals 30 30 30 30 
FE yes yes yes yes 
Table 4: Results for (i) monthly per capita health expenditures (unrelated to the child 45 
hospitalization), and (ii) monthly per capita hygiene, water and sanitation expenditures. For 46 
further information on the control variables and the specifications compare the note of Table 3. 47 
+/*/** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 48 
